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Abstract
The challenge faced by safety professionals continues to grow in complexity driven by factors such as larger more 
sophisticated systems, environmental issues, legal ramifications, moral concerns, and an ever-increasing desire to 
inch closer and closer towards achieving the goal of “zero-defects”. The strive for process improvement is on a 
continuum and the desire for process excellence has become more than just a fashionable obsession. Arguably a more 
sophisticated means to capture the safety efforts is required.
Over the last few years there has been a trend towards making safety regulations less prescriptive and be more 
goal oriented. Are goal-based safety regulations truly a step forward? Although ‘Safety Case’ is stated as a 
requirement in many safety standards, should it be included as an explicit requirement? Let’s take a closer look at 
what is a Safety Case. According to one of the definitions employed in the Industry, a Safety Case is, “A documented 
body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given 
application in a given environment”. This may be a starting point in the attempt to define and describe a safety case.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection 
1. Background
The “Role of safety and product integrity” can be defined from a number of different perspectives, 
from the regulator’s viewpoint, the producer or developer’s perspective, from the 
operational/organizational view or the user’s perspective. Even though these views overlap and intersect 
each other, to cover the entire spectrum, in detail, was determined to be a daunting challenge. Therefore, 
focus will remain on why an organized, well planned and properly documented safety case is required 
when dealing with safety-critical systems. It takes a deeper dive into what is a safety case, provides an 
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outline of safety management system and shares examples of a complex system from the aviation 
industry.
2. Challenge
The challenge faced by safety professionals continues to grow in complexity driven by factors such as 
larger more sophisticated systems, environmental issues, legal ramifications, moral concerns, and an ever-
increasing desire to inch closer and closer towards achieving the goal of “zero-defects”. The strive for 
process improvement is on a continuum and the desire for process excellence has become more than just a 
fashionable obsession. Arguably a more sophisticated means to capture the safety efforts is required.  
3. Points to Ponder
Over the last few years there has been a trend towards making safety regulations less prescriptive and 
be more goal oriented. 
• Are goal-based safety regulations truly a step forward? 
• Although ‘Safety Case’ is stated as a requirement in many safety standards, should it be included 
as an explicit requirement? 
Let’s take a closer look at what is a Safety Case. According to one of the definitions employed in the 
Industry, a Safety Case is, 
“A documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is 
adequately safe for a given application in a given environment”. (1) 
This may serve as a good starting point in the attempt to define and describe a safety case. Before 
delving deeper into the workings of a safety case it will be helpful to establish the definitions for certain 
important terms. These definitions will provide further context and also serve as a framework for us to 
operate within.
4. Definition of Safety
In the aviation industry, specifically on the commercial side the ICAO defines safety as:
“The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and 
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk 
management”. (2)
The ICAO definition is rather broad in its coverage but offers a good insight into the term safety from 
aviation regulatory perspective. The definition also introduces additional terms such as, “an acceptable 
level”, “continuing process of hazard identification” and “risk management” that are important to 
consider when developing a safety case. To understand the role of safety in a practical sense we need to 
consider a framework through which conventional safety processes such as, hazard identification and risk 
mitigation that are part of well defined and documented safety management system can be mapped using 
a safety case infrastructure. Developing a deeper understanding of these concepts is essential if we are to 
apply the ICAO definition of safety into a practical environment.
Before we get deeper into the ICAO definition lets look at another definition of safety that is more 
common to the occupational environment and provides a broader coverage by including occupational 
illness and damage to the environment;
“Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of 
equipment or property, or damage to the environment.” (3)
In the past decade the role of safety has matured and we can more clearly signify the value-add it can 
provide. Arguably, there are still pockets where safety is still viewed as a “rubber-stamp”, something that 
can be tacked-on at the end. In certain industries concept of safety continues to lay dormant and passive 
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creating a risk, or at the least a lost opportunity for risk reduction. However, in most industries there is 
evidence that continued work to highlight the significant impact “safety” can have on “product integrity” 
and “brand image” provides the industry a more clearer understanding of how safety helps in managing 
the overall risk. The industries that have been the flag bearers for safety over the last three decades and 
have led the charge to force safety to become more robust and to stand and deliver are the same industries 
that are benefiting from those improvements. Examples of those industries include space explorations 
(now moving into commercial arena) (4), nuclear power industry facing tremendous pressure from the 
recent disasters in Japan (5), Rail-road industry expansions in China and Australia (6), Aviation Industry 
which continues to see tremendous growth and increase over the next decade in India and China (7).
The term safety should not be totally equated to “risk-free” (8). Risk Management is a more practical 
term than “safety” (9) and unless additional context is included along side the term “safety” most readers 
can misunderstand its role. “Practical safety is risk management” and once that link has been clearly 
established the role of safety becomes significant and its value-add more measurable.
Returning back to ICAO definition of safety, within the aviation industry, the notion of “Zero 
Accidents” is considered problematic by regulators. The elimination of accidents and the achievement of 
absolute control are certainly desirable, however, ICAO claims that – and I quote: “they are unachievable 
goals in open and dynamic operational context.” (2) Therefore, concept of safety must encompass 
relatives rather than “absolutes” and the aviation safety professionals have to embrace that notion. Let’s
take a closer look at System Safety definition;
“The application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize safety 
within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system 
life cycle” (10)
System safety does not automatically include software safety. Let’s take a closer look a the various 
phases of a typical system life cycle;
Design Build Modify
Operate
SupportTest Disposal
Integrate/
Install
(Figure 1)
Time & Resources are expended over several years to.. Managing Risk
(Figure 2) 
Throughout the system life cycle safety focuses on one critical aspect – “manage the RISK”.
To accomplish the task of managing the risk in the context of system life cycle we have to ensure that 
the term “RISK” is considered in relevance to safety. Risk is a function of probability and severity and 
can be defined as;
“Assessment of the potential for a hazard to result in a mishap.”
In the context of safety a hazard can be viewed as a condition that can cause injury, illness, or death 
to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment. 
Hazard can also be simply defined as;
“A condition that can lead to an incident or accident.”
After all risk mitigation techniques have been employed, implemented and exhausted, frequently, if 
not always some “risk” still continues to exist. This has given birth to another term that is commonly used 
when considering the role of safety and that is, “Residual Risk”, which has been defined as;
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“The remaining risk that exists after all mitigation techniques have been implemented or exhausted, in 
accordance with the system safety design order of precedence.”
The “safety thinking” has also evolved over the last fifty years. Looking back, historically, the 1970’s 
there were major technological advances in aviation industry, jet engines, airborne radars, autopilot, flight 
directors etc. As these leading technologies got introduced the human work load, training/readiness, team-
environment all became imminent challenges.  This led to the human factors era through the 1980s and 
1990s human performance was singled out as the recurring factor in safety breakdowns. Through the last 
two decades focus shifted to recognizing that individuals do not operate in a vacuum but instead within a 
“defined operational context”. So Safety began to be viewed from a systemic perspective, to encompass 
all technical, human and organizational factors. Professor James Reason developed a model which 
provides a means of understanding this (2).
An article published in recent issue of Flight Safety Foundation publication (11) talks about how main 
body of research for the last 30 years has shown that aviation accidents mainly are “organizational 
accidents”. However, the article argues that the role of the individual cannot be discounted, indicating that 
in the coming decade we may be witnessing a shift away from sole focus on organizational factors.
Safety Risk Management needs to consider both direct and indirect costs. The consequences can be 
dire if all aspects of risk are not taken into account. These can include;
• The loss itself
• Litigation issues
• Loss of manpower
• Delays (time lost)
• Loss of Irrecoverable Assets
• Investigation expenses
HUMAN FACTORS
 
1950s 1970s 1990s 2000s
(Figure 3) 
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• Corporate Reputations
• Environmental damage.
A structured approach is needed to accomplish risk assessment and management. The safety 
standards and regulations invariably provide the motivation and a well defined, organized, properly 
documented and fully executed Safety Management System (SMS) provides the necessary framework to 
manage the “RISK”.  For UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) projects safety standards and regulations are a 
contractual requirement. The Defense Standard 00-56 as an example (12) provides a goal-based criteria 
and has moved away from a fully prescriptive set of requirements. It projects Safety as a shared 
responsibility and sorting out the boundaries of responsibility between the supplier and the user can 
become a challenging task. Other relevant safety standards and regulations employed in a typical UK 
MoD project can also include the Joint Service Publications (13), Project Oriented Safety Management 
System (14). Project Oriented Environmental Management System (15).
5. Future direction of Safety Standards and Regulations
There seems to be a trend for standards and regulations to be moving away from prescriptive 
requirements. The various different types of alternatives being considered include;
• Goal-Based or Goal-Oriented
• Performance-Based or Results-Based
• Science-Based
• Risk-Focused or Risk-Informed
• Self Regulation
• Behavior-Based
The move away from prescriptive safety standards and regulations does not necessarily mean we 
have to select a single other method to follow. A single ideology is not the answer because one size may 
not fit all. Looking at the future a combination of the various other methods to ensure overall safety 
objective are met and the ultimate goal of “Zero-Defects” may be the more prudent approach. 
Canadian National Energy Board Damage Prevention Regulations were released in fall of 2010. 
These are goal-based and are a significant departure from the previous version of Regulations which were 
very prescriptive (16). The shift away from prescriptive requirement is evident however; the process is 
extremely slow as the regulations being replaced have been in place since 1988.
In the wake of the shift in how safety standards and regulations may be viewed the objectives of what 
we as system safety professionals want to achieve remains the same;
• Reduced risk
• Increased protection
• Early detection
• Error reduction
From the regulators point of view the standards and regulations need to be defensible, structured and 
systematic, repeatable and comprehensive. The safety regulators demand to see that an auditable process 
has been followed, it is documented or can be demonstrated. They also want to ensure that all possible 
failures have been considered and all hazards have been identified. As we have argued that zero-defects is 
a noble goal but truly a safety process to encompass all possible failures and all hazards cannot be 
realistically achieved.
6. Safety Management System
While new techniques and methodologies will continue to evolve one thing is clear, there is a common 
thread when dealing with Safety related regulations, standards and legislation. Mostly all safety standards 
and regulations outline the requirement for a safety management system to be in place.
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We have seen ICAO definition of safety lets now see ICAO definition of safety management system 
(SMS) (2);
“A systemic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, 
accountabilities, policies and procedures. In simplest terms SMS is the application of business 
management practices to the management of safety.”
We see that ICAO introduces the notion of safety management as a systematic activity. Across the 
industry there are three safety management strategies that can be identified;
• Reactive Processes – defined as “in the past”, looking at data that exists. This strategy responds 
to events that have already happened, such as past incidents and accidents.
• Proactive Processes – defined as “in the present”, looking at what more can be done with the 
data and information that exists. This strategy actively seeks the identification of hazardous 
conditions through the analysis of the organization’s processes.
• Predictive Processes – defined as “in the future”, considers “what if” scenarios and tries to 
simulate the entire environment not just the failures and hazards. This strategy analyses system 
processes and environment beyond the known failures and hazards to identify potential future 
problems.
A good safety management system helps qualify and quantify the value-add safety provides.
7. Risk Management and Mitigation
The risk mitigation hierarchy starts with ignorance which delivers the highest risk. The risk is lowered 
as we work our way through hope performing inspections, leading to operate-fail-fix cycle and 
progressing to innovation where risk is mitigated by transferring it to another party. The lowest levels of 
risk can be achieved by have a system safety program in place. Having a documented safety program in 
place and practicing it is essential. The maturity of a system safety program comes from applying it. The 
more it is put to use the higher benefit it will provide.
A practical way to assessing the risk is to consider both aspects the severity and probability. The 
cross section of severity and probability gives a qualitative classification which when translated with 
probability of failure figures can be quantified. A typical risk assessment matrix used by safety looks like;
HAZARD
CATEGORIZATION
SEVERITY
CATASTROPHIC CRITICAL MARGINAL NEGLIGIBLE
1 2 3 4
F 
R 
E
Q 
U 
E
N 
C 
Y
FREQUENT         A
PROBABLE     
OCCASIONAL    
REMOTE
IMPROBABLE
B
C
D
E
High
Medium
Low
(Figure 4) 
The importance of risk classification comes from every hazard being classified per a structured risk 
assessment.
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8. What is a Safety Case?
The concept of safety case has already been adopted across many industries including, defense, 
aerospace, railways, nuclear power generation, and space program.  The safety case clearly demonstrates 
how safety will be, is being and has been achieved and maintained. Consider safety case as a means to 
communicate, therefore clarity is a very important attribute of a good safety case.  A safety case should 
communicate a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument that a system is acceptably safe to operate 
in a particular context (17).
As we have previously mentioned assuring system safety is a formidable task. A system cannot be 
proven to be safe unless it has been operated over all possible inputs to ensure that it can never reach a 
hazardous state. For most complex systems exhaustive testing is impractical, and coverage of all possible 
failure conditions is impossible. The developers of safety-critical systems and safety professionals who 
investigate the failures of such systems share a common goal of ensuring that the system does, in 
operation, meet the goals set out in its safety case. This assurance process is most efficient and effective 
when the relationship between a system’s operation and the case for its safety is clearly stated and 
exploited.  
A safety case provides four key assurances;
• A methodical approach to minimize safety risk
• Help demonstrate safety to regulators and stakeholders
• Emphasizes the process and behavior of the system
• An organized way to develop, document and argue safety risk
One of the best definitions of a safety case I have come across states;
“…a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, 
comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given environment.” 
(18)
The safety case contains a structured argument (rationale) demonstrating that the evidence contained 
therein is sufficient to show that the system is safe. Also, the argument should commensurate with the 
potential risk and the system’s complexity. In order to be compelling and comprehensible a safety case 
and its derived reports must “tell a story.” Arguably the “argument” is considered the most crucial piece 
of a safety case.
9. Why use safety case methodology?
The reasons to justify using a structured methodology when performing system safety analysis are as 
follows;
• Increasingly required by law/regulation/standards
• Provides an effective way to deal with the emergence of goal-based safety standards
• A structured repository for key assurance information
• Complexity – vast amount of data can be integrated, captured and referenced
• Demonstrable – fulfils the need to be independently auditable 
• Integration of suppliers data – geographical and cultural diversity
• Range of risks associated with “failures”
o Operational
o Cost
o Reputational
o Project
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10. Main Elements of a Safety Case
The main elements of a safety case are claims, arguments and evidence (19).  
• Claim about a property of the system or some subsystem.
• Argument linking the evidence to the claim, which can be deterministic, probabilistic or 
qualitative.
• Evidence which is used as the basis of the safety argument. This can be facts, (e.g. based on 
established scientific principles and prior research), assumptions, or sub-claims, derived from a 
lower-level sub-argument.
(Figure 5)
The evidence can be a sub-claim produced by a secondary or subsidiary safety case. This means that 
there can be a relatively simple top-level argument supported by a hierarchy of subsidiary safety cases. 
This structured approach makes it easier to represent the main argument and to allow partitioning of 
safety cases that may be independently produced and then brought together under the larger structure to 
make an overall cohesive argument.
It is also possible to have two or more arguments that are independent supporting the same claim.
11. Summary
As we move away from prescriptive standards the need for a robust framework around safety risk 
management will continue to grow. The safety case argues that a system is safe to use in its intended 
environment. More specifically, it argues that the risks associated with the operation of the system have 
been reduced to an acceptable level.  
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